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1. Introduction
Public  equity  represents  a  much  desired,  yet  hardly  attainable  stage  in  the  financial  policy  of 
technology-based small firms (TBSFs). The reasons are fairly clear: TBSFs enjoy rich endowments of 
intangible  assets  but  lack  “hard”  and  collateralizable  assets,  their  track  record  is  short,  and  their 
likelihood of survival is relatively low. The products and services offered by TBSFs largely depend on 
the application of scientific and technological knowledge (Allen 1992), and their founders, who often 
have educational backgrounds in science or technology, suffer from limited financial and marketing 
expertise. Partly to avoid the implied liquidity and valuation difficulties, stock exchanges usually set 
listing  requirements  in  terms  of  minimal  capitalization,  profitability,  free  float  and  track  record 
thresholds. TBSFs can rarely satisfy these conditions. 
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And yet, market-based financial support to TBSFs has been high on the policy agendas for the 
last thirty years, especially in the European Union, and market segments catering to small, young, high-
tech companies have been inaugurated by virtually all European stock exchanges (Bottazzi and Da Rin 
2005). The apparently paradoxical attention accorded to floating companies with low survival rates 
stimulates reflections on the forces behind the emergence of new markets, the interests that shape their 
architectures, the social desirability of their performances, and ultimately on the very role of financial 
markets as drivers and facilitators of innovative efforts – such as those carried out by TBSFs. 
This work provides an overview of the historical evolution, the organizational forms, and the 
performances of the stock exchanges and market segments specialized in public equity for small and 
growing companies,  set  up  in  Europe in  the last  thirty  years.  Our  analysis  mainly  deals  with the  
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), created by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1995, but our 
discussion involves, in passing, also the "feeder" markets established in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as 
the "New Markets" created in the 1990s. In our view, the case under study tells a lot about four issues 
that are of key importance for market-based financial support to TBSFs. 
First  of  all,  let  us  consider  the  role  of  private  and  public  interests  in  market  emergence. 
Facilitating  the  flotation  of  small  and  growing  firms  can  be  seen  as  a  way  to  solve  a  market  
incompleteness problem that drives the economy away from Pareto optimality. This is consistent with 
the  increasing  reliance  on  incentive  design  as  a  key  tool  to  achieve  public  goals,  or  with  the 
"marketization" of  public  policy (Cerny 1992) that  is  driving the  European varieties  of  capitalism 
closer to the American one (Hall and Soskice 2001). Public intervention then becomes the necessary 
trigger for private activity. For instance, in light of the complementarity between stock markets and 
venture capital (VC) funds, policy-makers may have promoted the emergence of stock markets for 
growing companies as a way to enlarge the exit opportunities for VC investments. This would be in 
line with previous evidence showing that, in setting the stage for an active private equity industry, the 
involvement of public  bodies was essential,  both in  the US (Lerner 1996) and in Europe (see the 
evidence confirming the "seeding hypothesis" by public VC: Leleux and Surlemont 2003, Beuselinck 
and Manigart 2007). 
Second issue: what shapes the market organizational forms, or, what lies behind the choice of a 
certain market architecture? With respect to stock markets for growing companies, key architectural 
parameters concern the admission requirements, the level of information disclosure, and the allocation 
of  regulatory responsibilities.  Light  regulatory settings  can run counter  the  monopoly positions  of 
national stock exchanges on order flow, and can harm their liquidity if too many risky companies are 
allowed to go public. However, setting the entry and information requirements too high may discourage 
participation by TBSFs altogether, against the public goal of providing market-based financial support 
to new innovative ventures. How to solve this trade-off is an issue needing discussion. 
A third issue concerns the macroeconomic consequences of stock market regulation. One of the 
lessons that we have learned from the most recent recessions is that global financial stability crucially 
relies on careful regulatory oversight on the financial system. Such a lesson has been translated by 
policy-makers into tighter requirements for financial disclosure on public companies and intermediaries 
(e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and stricter capital requirements on banks (as with the Basel II 
Accords). However, stock market segments for growing companies create opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage,  therefore  leaving the  global  financial  system exceedingly open to unsuitable companies, 
financial  fads,  and  even  to  cash  shells.  The  entailed  risks  are  even  more  likely  to  materialize  if  
regulatory oversight is outsourced to financial intermediaries, possibly due to conflicts of interest. At 
the same time, in countries with a highly skewed firm size distribution, such as Italy, facilitating the  
access of small firms to public equity is seen as a way out of the macroeconomic recession (see Cardia  
2010).
A fourth and last issue of interest involves the balance between social costs and benefits of 
market-based financial support to TBSFs. Is the quotation of TBSFs worth the public and social costs 
associated with their large failure rates? Santarelli and Vivarelli (2002) asked a similar question about 
subsidies  to  new entrants,  and  their  answer  was  that  subsidizing  entry  might  distort  the  learning 
processes that drive the dynamics of start-ups, and may corrode the market shares of the most efficient 
firms, while the positive effects are likely to vanish once the subsidy expires. All of this would result in 
a waste of resources. One wonders whether the same holds when financial support is provided through 
financial  markets.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  observed  that  architectural  choices  often  rely  on  the 
imitation of the organizational features of foreign markets – as it is  the case with European stock 
exchanges  “copying”  the  Nasdaq.  Yet,  it  is  increasingly  suggested  that  the  evolution  of  financial 
systems is constrained by path dependencies, involving inertia in household saving patterns, investment 
behaviors,  corporate  ownership  structures,  industrial  relations,  welfare  systems,  education,  and the 
organization of research activities (Bianco et al.  1997; Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Hölzl 2006; Vitols 
2005).  If  so,  different  countries  have  little  to  learn  from each  other’s  experiences,  and  imitative 
architectural choices can impose heavy social costs if the complementary institutions (in the sense of 
Aoki 2001) have not adapted. 
For the above mentioned reasons, it is worthwhile reviewing the main facts on the performance 
of high-tech stock markets, and of AIM in particular. Section 2 outlines the historical evolution of the 
second-tier markets for growing companies, while Section 3 illustrates some taxonomies proposed in 
the literature, with the aim of uncovering insights on the determinants of market architecture.  The 
existing empirical evidence on the performance of AIM is reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
2. A historical outline
Within the European context, the earliest attempts to set up second-tier markets for growing firms date 
back to the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The pioneering markets for TBSFs were based on the so-
called feeder principle: their function was to select the most profitable young companies and feed them 
upward to the main markets. The quotation of TBSFs was favoured by low admission requirements and 
low information standards. Posner (2004, p.6) reports an exhaustive list of the stock markets based on 
the feeder principle. Those early experiences were unsuccessful: most investors perceived that feeder 
markets  housed  only  poorly  performing  companies  and  preferred  to  wait  for  the  best  ones  to  be 
promoted to the main market (Posner 2004, 2009). Most feeder markets did not survive the 1987 stock 
market crash (Mallin and Ow-Yong 1998; Weber and Posner 2000; Ritter 2003). 
In 1993, the European Union passed the Investment Services Directive (ISD), legislation aimed at 
integrating  national  investment  services,  including  stock  exchanges,  by  extending  the  principle  of 
mutual recognition to service providers. By virtue of the ISD, an exchange regulated in one European 
Union country could operate in another via electronic networks and computer terminals. This enabled 
the creation of a pan-European stock exchange for young high-tech companies, which was promoted by 
the European Commission together with the European Venture Capital Association (Weber and Posner 
2000; Posner 2004). The new market, the Easdaq, was inaugurated in 1996. Since it took the Nasdaq as 
an organizational model, it coupled low entry requirements with strong informational standards.
The forthcoming creation of the Easdaq was felt by national exchanges as a threat: the risk that 
financial activity might migrate to the new pan-European stock market led most national exchanges to 
set up their own versions of stock markets for growing companies at the domestic level. The London 
Stock Exchange anticipated by creating the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in June 1995. The 
Paris  Bourse  responded in 1996 by inaugurating the  Nouveau Marché,  and in  1997 the  Deutsche 
Boerse established the Neuer Markt. Finally, trading on the Italian Nuovo Mercato began in June 1999. 
The so-called New Markets (NM) were designed according to the Nasdaq organizational model, except 
the AIM, that was closer to the old feeders. Admission and listing requirements on NMs have been 
summarized and analyzed by Clatworthy and Peel (1998), Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002), Goergen et al. 
(2004),  Burghof  and  Hunger  (2004)  and  Posner  (2009)  among  others.  The  NMs  set  milder 
requirements than the main markets regarding capitalization, profitability, pre-IPO shareholder equity, 
IPO value, free float and track record, but tighter information disclosure rules appointing sponsors to 
certify the company's compliance with the financial requirements and offer supervision and advice in 
the quotation process and in communications to the regulatory authorities; appointing market makers 
who match buyers and sellers; providing accounting information in line with international standards; 
and complying with lock-up rules constraining the disposal of shares by insiders.
The historical  evolution of the main European NMs is  represented in Table 1,  reporting the 
number of member companies and the capitalization (in million USD) of the AIM, the Neuer Markt,  
the Nouveau Marché, the Nuovo Mercato and the Nasdaq for comparison, between 1995 and 2008. As 
it can be easily grasped, none of the European markets comes even close to matching the size of the 
Nasdaq. The New Markets created by national exchanges in continental Europe experienced very fast 
growth only in the early years. The Neuer Markt soon came to be the leading high-tech exchange in 
Europe, reaching a capitalization peak of more than USD 113 billion in 2000; in the same year, the 
Nouveau Marché overtook the AIM in capitalization terms, with the younger Nuovo Mercato almost 
catching up with them. All of this urged the London Stock Exchange to make the AIM rules more 
rigorous,  and to set up the TechMARK segment in 1999, aiming to allow clearer identification of 
innovative and R&D-intensive companies within the official listing. Since then, the AIM has sought to 
broaden its focus to SMEs in general, also outside high-tech sectors; moreover, prior admission to the  
LSE was an eligibility requirement in the TechMARK. In a way, these facts testify that the enthusiasm 
of the British for the quotation of TBSFs dried up quite early.
As of 2001, the burst  of the so-called Internet bubble hit  all  the markets quite hard.  Several 
companies  were  forced  to  admit  that  they  could  not  meet  the  earning  forecasts  declared  in  the 
introduction prospectuses, and the ensuing bankruptcies contributed to a general downward trend in 
stock prices and capitalization, resulting in numerous de-listings and making new IPOs rare. Between 
2000 and 2002, the drop in capitalization was dramatic: -91% in the Neuer Markt and -68% in the 
French and Italian NMs, less so in the Nasdaq (-44%) and in the AIM (-25%). The Neuer Markt and 
Easdaq ceased operations in 2003. In January 2005, the Paris Bourse replaced the first market, the 
second market and the French NM with a single official list (Eurolist by Euronext). The Italian NM 
was replaced in September 2005 by MTAX; the relevant legislation shows that admission requirements 
are now very similar to those in the main market.
The corporate and accounting scandals that marred the Internet bubble, rooted in conflicts of 
interest and insufficient regulatory controls, pushed regulators post 2001 to reinforce both the capital 
requirements on banks (see the Basel II  Accords) and the requirements for financial disclosure on 
public companies and intermediaries - as with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The restrictions 
on credit supply implied by the former may have stimulated the demand for public equity by TBSFs,  
while  European  markets  seem to  be  better  suited  to  satisfy  such  greater  demand,  in  light  on  the 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage between the US and Europe induced by the SOX. At the same 
time, the process of harmonization of the investment services across the European Union, commenced 
with the ISD, was further developed by means of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of 1999, 
the  Lamfalussy  process,  and their  main  offspring,  namely  the  Markets  in  Financial  Intermediaries 
Directive (MiFID). Issued in 2004, and transposed into national legislation in most EU countries by 
November 2007, MiFID challenged the dominant positions of the national stock exchanges in two 
ways. First, it repealed the concentration rule (Art. 14(3) of the 1993 ISD), according to which retail  
orders handled by financial intermediaries had to be executed on a regulated market. Second, it allows 
other  trading  platforms  (the  so-called  Multilateral  Trading  Facilities,  or  MTF)  to  compete  with 
regulated markets for order flow.  
Against  the background of a changing financial landscape, the AIM managed to survive and 
experienced  accelerated  growth  in  capitalization  and  in  the  number  of  listed  companies.  NYSE-
Euronext reacted to the enhanced post-MiFID competitive environment by setting up Alternext, a MTF 
closely modeled on the AIM (Davies 2008, Degryse 2009),  while First  North was inaugurated by 
Nasdaq-OMX. The AIM model was "exported" also as Tokyo AIM (2009) through a joint-venture 
between the LSE and the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and as AIM Italy (2009) following the acquisition of 
Borsa Italiana by the LSE. After the implementation of MiFID in the UK, the stocks listed on the AIM 
started to be traded on Plus, a British MTF focusing on small-caps. The increasing influence of the 
AIM regulatory model is witnessed also by recent developments in US stock markets, such as the birth 
of OTCQX (Mendoza 2008). Outside Europe, the TSX Venture Exchange (formerly Canadian Venture 
Exchange, established in 1999) stands out as yet another long-lasting second-tier market for growing 
companies,  competing  with  private  venture  capital  for  micro-cap  firms  at  the  pre-revenue  stage 
(Carpentier, L'Her, and Suret 2010). 
3. Taxonomies of market organizational forms
In this section, we describe the organizational forms of stock markets for growing companies by means 
of three taxonomies proposed in the literature, and we give some insights as to the determinants of such 
organizational forms.
3.1. Listing requirements, information disclosure, and regulatory responsibilities
In a rather general way, one can view the architecture of a stock market as made up of building blocks. 
Specifically, a stock market features: a listing process, an information disclosure process, a trading 
system or price determination process, an oversight process, a sanction process, a graduation process, 
and the  exchange’s  governance structure.  Not  all  stock markets  include all  such components.  For 
instance, many MTFs are mere trading systems (e.g. Chi-X Europe) as they trade in stocks listed in 
regulated exchanges. Graduation is the process through which a company delists from a second-tier 
market and is admitted on a first-tier market, and as such, it is absent from first-tier  markets. The 
organizational innovations brought about by feeders in the Seventies and Eighties and by the New 
Markets in the Nineties mostly concerned the listing and information disclosure processes. The turn of 
the  century  has  witnessed  changes  in  the  governance  of  stock  exchanges,  which  are  increasingly 
undergoing demutualization,  whereas  MiFID pushes  the  national  stock exchanges to improve their 
trading systems along several dimensions,  such as  execution price,  speed, likelihood of  execution, 
likelihood of settlement - a goal sometimes attained by integrating the competitors' trading technologies 
into their own system - as with LSE's acquisition of Project Turquoise. 
A few attempts have been made at classifying the architecture of markets for growing companies, 
focusing on the way the above mentioned building blocks are arranged. A first taxonomy, based on the 
trading system, distinguishes between order-driven and quote-driven markets. Such a classification is 
not  specific  to  second-tier  markets,  and  has  been  widely  studied  in  the  literature  on  market 
microstructure (O'Hara 1995, Spulber 1999). A second taxonomy, introduced by Posner (2005, 2009), 
maps exchanges along two dimensions: barriers to listing and informational standards. Finally,  the 
listing, disclosure, and sanction processes can be organized according to alternative regulatory models, 
inspired respectively to the rules-based approach and the principles-based approach (Rousseau 2007). 
These taxonomies explore complementary aspects of market functioning, and are partly overlapping.  
3.1.1. Order-driven vs. quote-driven markets
The explicit consideration of trading rules in the analysis of stock markets highlights two major trading 
systems or  price-determination processes,  yielding two polar  market  settings:  price-driven markets 
(market making) and order-driven markets (where orders are stored in a book). In the former case, 
prices are set by market makers and contribute to raise orders. In the latter case, the confrontation of 
sell orders and buy orders generates prices. The Nasdaq, followed by the LSE, is historically the main 
instance of a price-driven market, while countries in continental Europe and in Japan tend to use order-
driven systems. Nowadays almost all stock exchanges have adopted a hybrid system, combining an 
electronic  book with market  makers.  The main advantage of  a  market  making system is  the high 
liquidity provided by market makers (see for a synthesis Madhavan, 2002). Market makers allow to 
reduce the temporal imbalances in order flow by maintaining a presence (Gossman and Miller, 1988; 
Venkataraman  and  Waisburd,  2007),  and  contribute  to  fill  gaps  from  unbalanced  order  arrivals 
(Demsetz, 1968, Nimalendran and Petrella, 2003). The liquidity provided by market makers can also be 
viewed as a public good with positive externalities (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002). A more recent and 
original  argument comes from Mao and Pagano (2007),  who consider the market  maker  as a  risk 
manager who may play a crucial role during excessive volatility periods. Such beneficial effects on 
liquidity  can  be  helpful  especially  for  low capitalization  companies.  On the  other  hand,  the  main 
disadvantages of a market governed by prices are the high transaction costs that are contained in the 
bid-ask spread (Pagano and Roell, 1990; Neal, 1992). Market making can be viewed as favorable for 
large  institutional  investors  because  they  can  negotiate  prices  within  the  market  makers’  spread 
(Madhavan,  1993),  hence  retail  investors  may  be  discouraged,  limiting  the  extent  of  the  market. 
Ultimately, the discrete power of the market makers can favor non competitive behaviors as it was the 
case in the Nasdaq during the mid-Eighties (Christie and Schulz, 1994, Barclay, 1997, Huang and Stoll, 
1996, Kandel  and Marx,  1997,  Dutta  and Madhavan, 1997 among others).  In 1994, investigations 
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the American Department of Justice 
on the Nasdaq reported non-competitive transactions. Nasdaq market makers adopted numerous illicit 
practices such as price collusion and spreading of private information (Guennif and Revest, 2005). 
Ultimately, whether TBSFs benefit from market making or not, it depends on the balance between risk 
mitigation and market power exercised by the market makers. 
3.1.2. Barriers to listing and informational standards
The taxonomy proposed by Posner (2005) ideally maps markets in a two-dimensional space defined by 
the strength of listing requirements and by the degree of information disclosure. Information disclosure 
can  be  proxied  by  the  accounting  standards  (national  or  international),  the  obligation  to  publish 
quarterly reports, the ad hoc disclosure of significant news, and the use of the English language in 
company  reports.  The  barriers  to  listing  concern  the  minimal  initial  requirements  in  terms  of 
capitalization, assets, equity capital,  trading history, and free float. Traditional stock exchanges are 
characterized  by  high  listing  requirements  and  tight  disclosure,  whereas  markets  for  growing 
companies  usually  impose  low listing  requirements.  However,  while  informational  disclosure  was 
rather low in the so-called feeders, it was higher in the Nasdaq, Easdaq and the markets in the Euro.NM 
circuit. 
Posner's emphasis on admission requirements and information disclosure is easily explained. The 
shares of small,  relatively untested companies are unlikely to be floated if  the companies  have to 
comply with the strict admission requirements of the official listings. It is well understood that high-
tech small and young enterprises are informationally opaque by the very nature of their business. Tight 
information standards are aimed to overcome such opacity. A company's decision to submit to tight  
information disclosure rules may nevertheless be interpreted as a signal of high entrepreneurial quality, 
possibly triggering positive selection dynamics. Further, the information disclosure process works as an 
interface between a national  stock market  and foreign players (be them TBSFs, intermediaries,  or 
investors), since the adoption of accounting standards and the use of a widely diffused language makes 
information intelligible worldwide.  By attracting the quotation of foreign TBSFs, tight information 
rules enlarge the pool of potential market entrants, thereby increasing the likelihood that the market 
attracts companies with high business potential. Also, greater compliance with international standards 
improves coverage by international analysts, possibly yielding beneficial reputation and risk-mitigation 
effects. By the same token, low information disclosure can discourage international investors, but quite 
interestingly it can serve the interests of the national shareholders and stakeholders against inflows of 
foreign capital, and can shield the national stock exchanges from mutual competition, preserving their 
positions as national monopolists on order flow. Instituting markets with low information standards is 
in line with the European tradition of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance systems (Charreaux 
and Desbrières 2001, Balling 2004). Whether TBSFs benefit from stock markets run in the interest of 
stakeholders is an empirical question, since other stakeholders (e.g. large and established companies) 
may have more influence on how the stock market is run. 
3.1.3. Rules-based vs. principles-based regulation
A  third  and  last  taxonomy  builds  upon  the  difference  between  rules-based  and  principles-based 
regulatory approaches  (Verheij  et  al.  1998,  Burgemeestre  et  al.  2009).  In  a  rules-based regulatory 
system, the content of regulation is made up of general, abstract, and universal rules, defined ex-ante, 
i.e. before adoption and implementation. Neither exceptions, nor discretionary behaviours are allowed. 
In “producing” the rules, the legislator takes duly into account the principles that lay behind the policy 
goals. In turn, principles give rise to reasons in favour ("pro-reasons") and against ("con-reasons"). The 
legislator then assigns a weight to each reason, and each rule is the outcome of a weighted comparison 
between pro- and con-reasons. In a principles-based regulatory system, instead, the weights to the pro- 
and  con-reasons  are  assigned  by  the  regulator  or  by  an  auditor  case  by  case,  and  case-specific 
circumstances  are taken into  account  when determining the  weights.  Participants  in  the  regulative 
process, therefore, hold discretionary power. Rules-based regulation prescribes how business should be 
conducted,  whereas principles-based regulation leaves companies free to decide how to align their 
conduct to the policy goals (Walsh 2008). 
Rousseau (2007) applies the rules-based vs. principles-based taxonomy to stock markets, with 
reference to the admission, oversight, and disclosure processes. In markets regulated through a rules-
based approach, the listing requirements are objectively defined, and the listed companies have to 
comply with formal rules, while in the principle-based regulatory approach, assessing the suitability of 
a  company  is  outsourced  to  specialized  financial  intermediaries  who  hold  discretionary  power  in 
performing their  assessment (see Rousseau 2007). Such "trust intermediaries" are called nominated 
advisers in AIM and sponsors in Alternext. Nasdaq, Easdaq, the markets belonging to the Euro.NM 
circuit, and TSXV fall into the rules-based camp. 
The case of AIM is an interesting illustration of the principles-based approach. AIM requires that 
every company seeking admission appoints a Nominated Advisor (Nomad). “A Nomad must be a legal 
entity with at  least  two recent years of corporate finance practice,  having at least four “qualified” 
executives and at least three relevant transactions for the same two years” (Litvintsev 2009, quoting 
AIM  Rules  for  Nominated  Advisers,  article,  February  2007).  Nomads  have  to  assess  whether  a 
company seeking admission is suitable for quotation, and later to provide assistance in order to ensure 
that  the  companies  respect  their  continuing  obligations.  Nomads  have  to  carry  out  a  rigorous 
examination  of  the  applicant’s  business  and  must  understand  in  detail  the  applicants’  activities: 
business plan,  managerial  structure,  financial  and legal  status,  and so forth.  AIM recommends the 
Nomads to visit the applicant’s site of operation and to employ external experts to analyze the firm’s 
business  (Mendoza,  2008,  p.  301).  Such  a  suitability  assessment  replaces  the  formal  listing 
requirements set by traditional stock markets. Nomads may also play an important role in corporate 
governance decisions, by persuading their clients to satisfy certain standards. As a matter of fact, the 
AIM rules do not mandate the adoption of specific corporate governance structures, and unlike LSE 
companies, AIM companies are not required to comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
All  in  all,  Nomads  act  as  gatekeepers,  advisers  and,  ultimately,  regulators  of  AIM-listed 
companies. Consistent with such decentralization/privatization of regulatory oversight responsibilities, 
the securities traded on AIM are not regulated by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA), and they do not  
need to be consistent with the EU directives implemented in the UK. Admission documents are not pre-
vetted by the exchange or UKLA in most circumstances. The discretionary power of the Nomads is 
compensated by the investors’ ability to prosecute Nomads if they are misled. Yet, reputation seems to 
be the most effective tool to limit the Nomads’ arbitrary power. 
The main advantages and disadvantages of a principles-based regulation emerge quite vividly. 
With a faster admission process and customized oversight and disclosure, companies going public on 
AIM save on transaction costs, that otherwise are born disproportionately by small companies. On top 
of this, the Nomads can perform certification and coaching roles for the quoted companies, much alike 
venture capitalists. Yet, with decentralized, discretionary admission and monitoring, the viability of the 
market ultimately rests on the competence and integrity of the sponsors/nominated advisers. For one, 
applying principles requires greater case-specific knowledge than applying rules,  as well  as deeper 
understanding of the interdependencies between different, possibly conflicting principles. Outsourcing 
the regulatory responsibilities to financial intermediaries may provide high-powered incentives towards 
building  such  necessary  competences,  but  knowledge  tacitness  (M.  Polanyi  1967)  and  bounded 
rationality  (Simon  1972)  could  seriously  compromise  the  effectiveness  of  regulatory  oversight, 
however tailored. Moral hazard may arise, too, since Nomads are hired and paid by the companies that 
they monitor, and can at the same time act as brokers and auditors for them (Gerakos et al. 2011).  
Social ties between market participants are likely to be rather strong, since the majority of the AIM 
investor’s base turns out to be made of “sophisticated investors”, more precisely institutional investors 
and investors specialized in the AIM companies (Mendoza, 2008, Gerakos et al., 2011). Institutional 
investors and the Nomads usually know each other well:  the admission mechanism often involves 
private placements, where few institutional investors are invited to acquire shares in the applicant firm 
before the IPO. This mechanism points out the case of a market not really open to the public.
In rules-based regulation, it is the policy-maker who needs competence and information to design 
general, abstract, and universal rules, and he/she needs them in advance, before actual implementation. 
Subsequent,  unforeseen  events  may  make  those  rules  ineffective  vis-à-vis  the  attainment  of  the 
underlying policy goals. Moreover, political economy considerations may cast doubts on the efficient 
collection and use of information by regulators and policy-makers - and consequently, on the adequacy 
of  the  rules.  Therefore,  uncertainty  and  government  failure  are  the  main  threats  of  rules-based 
regulation.
3.2. Insights on the determinants of market organization
In  line  with  Fligstein’s  (1996,  2001)  approach  of  markets  as  social  and  political  constructions, 
historical works in the fields of Sociology and Economics have underlined the connections between 
politics  and  the  rise  of  financial  markets  (Carruthers,  1999,  Neal  and  Davis,  2005).  The  former 
contribution insists on the continued interactions between the political elites, public finance and the 
stock  exchanges  in  the  rise  of  financial  markets  in  UK during  the  eighteenth  century.  The  latter 
contribution emphasizes the impact of the rules that governed memberships during the emergence of 
the LSE, the NYSE and the Paris Bourse, from 1792 to 1914. The authors showed to what extent 
incentives  for  innovation  depended  on  the  sources  of  income  of  the  traders,  which  in  turn  were 
determined by the institutional context and memberships rules. While Carruthers'  analysis is really 
close to Fligstein's (1996) proposal that markets should be viewed as political constructions (Preda, 
2007), both historical works share the view that national regulation and powerful groups of actors play 
a  role  in  the  design  of  a  financial  market.  Yet,  regulatory  changes  can  produce  unexpected 
consequences as it was illustrated in the case of the Paris Stock Exchange, through the 1893 and 1898 
reforms (Hautcoeur et al., 2009).
Consistently, the history of European stock markets for growing companies provides a peculiar 
view-point  on  how  the  organizational  forms  can  be  described  by  the  adaptive  responses  and 
interactions  of  public  and  private  actors  to  the  threats  and  opportunities  posed  by  ever  changing 
macroeconomic and technological environments. In particular, one can identify two main tendencies: 
on the one hand, the role of supranational financial reforms in the emergence of stock markets for 
growing  companies,  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  role  of  the  national  stock  exchanges  -  as  parent 
organizations of the newly instituted markets - in shaping their market architectures.  
 Posner's (2005) account of the emergence high-tech stock markets in Europe is enlightening. 
Second-tier markets were established in the Seventies and Eighties under political pressure to help 
SMEs garner access to public equity. The design of such markets, however, was left to national stock 
exchanges, and is revealing of a misalignment between the policy goals and the private interests of the 
exchanges. As a matter of fact, in the design of their second-tier markets, the national stock exchanges 
had to satisfy only one constraint for compliance with the policy goals: the entry barriers had to be low, 
in order to allow flotation of young small caps. Given that, the exchanges had considerable degrees of  
freedom in designing the other "building blocks". Such architectural choices were made in order to 
avoid two main risks. First, quoting small and untested companies might have scared investors, due to 
the implied information asymmetries, harming in turn the liquidity of large caps. Second, although the 
opacity  of  TBSFs  might  have  been  mitigated  through  tight  information  disclosure  rules,  tight 
information standards were incompatible with the positions of the exchanges as national monopolies on 
order flow. Markets such as the USM (UK) and the Second Marché (France) adopted lax information 
standards, and pro-actively used the graduation process (or feeder mechanism) to make sure that the 
best second-tier companies would feed upwards to the main market.  
The  birth  of  Easdaq  and  the  ensuing  flurry  of  New  Markets  can  be  traced  back  to  public 
influence, too, through at least two channels. For one, the project of setting up a pan-European stock 
market would not be feasible without the Investment Service Directive, since Easdaq exploited the 
principle of mutual recognition and the enhanced opportunities for electronic trading permitted by the 
ISD. This highlights the role  of the European legislature as enabler of market  emergence.  But,  as 
reported  by  Posner  (2005),  public  actors  did  more.  In  particular,  the  European Commission  (EC) 
officials from DG13 (Information and Innovation) and DG23 (SMEs, Enterprise) actively promoted 
Easdaq. The interests of European Commission officials were aligned with key private actors, such as 
the EVCA. The EC officials pursued the goal of integrating the national financial markets, and at the 
same time were eager to find solutions to the structural unemployment and technology slow-down 
problems  incurred  by  the  European  economies.  EVCA  sought  wider  exit  opportunities  for  the 
investments made by their associates, and believed that new exit opportunities could best be provided 
by a broad, international, liquid stock market tailored to the needs of high-tech companies with little 
trading history but  high growth potential.  The European Commission  promoted political  discourse 
linking job creation to venture capital investments, used its resources and encouragement to convince 
EVCA members that were against the Easdaq project, provided financial support to two preliminary 
studies to the non-profit organization EASD, and gave subsidies for Easdaq's early times of operation 
(Posner 2005). Private initiatives by the national stock exchanges for the supply of new markets only 
surfaced  when  the  threat  of  a  publicly-subsidized  pan-European  stock  market  materialized.  The 
national stock exchanges would probably have been better off without high-tech segments housing 
risky ventures, but because the other national exchanges set up their own high-tech segments, it was in 
their own interest to respond. One may envisage a sort of strategic complementarity between the stock 
exchanges' decisions to supply new markets, with the entailed multiple equilibria problems.  
Interestingly,  all  of the so-called New Markets but AIM adopted a market  design tailored to 
closely follow the Nasdaq approach (tight information standards, low entry barriers). The reason why 
Nasdaq was chosen as the reference model is still disputed. Although it has been viewed through the 
lens of efficiency by economists, explanations rooted in the quest for political consensus have been 
advanced, too (see Posner 2005). Nasdaq was publicized as a vital factor in the American success with 
new technologies, such as biotechnology (see Coriat, Orsi and Weinstein, 2003).
However, given the feeders' inability to perform, Nasdaq must have appeared as the only credible 
alternative design regardless of its purported macroeconomic effects, a view that allows for an adaptive 
learning perspective. In line with a knowledge-based approach to institutional change, Easdaq and the 
New  Markets  could  be  thought  of  enacting  imitation  strategies  targeting  the  Nasdaq  market 
architecture. Not by chance, Posner (2005) speaks of "Nasdaq copies". Following Rivkin (2000), the 
likelihood  of  success  of  an  imitation  strategy  is  tuned  by  complexity  of  the  targeted  market  
architecture. The relevant definition of complexity, here, is that provided by Simon (1962): market 
architecture  is  complex  if  it  consists  of  many  components  and  those  components  are  highly 
interdependent,  so  that  novelties  imply  an  extensive  reorganization  of  the  whole  architecture. 
Complexity implies causal ambiguity, namely the difficulty to fully understand the causal connection 
between  architectural  features  and  market  performance  (liquidity,  efficiency,  viability).  Therefore, 
highly complex architectures can withstand successful imitation attempts even when information about 
them is open to public scrutiny, or when several ingredients are correctly reproduced by the imitators. 
If such intuition is correct, the historical record of collapsing New Markets provides circumstantial 
evidence that the building blocks of high-tech stock markets are richly interdependent, and shows that 
much knowledge required to imitate market architecture is  tacit.  Nonetheless,  interactions between 
economic agents are framed not only by formal rules, but also by informal constraints. The informal 
practices and routines that have materialized in a particular market can hardly be codified, let alone the 
social relationships that lay behind the networks of actors (see White 1981, Baker 1984, Granovetter 
1985 on financial markets). The broad, country-specific institutional context where a new market is 
implemented matters, too, with all its complementarities which, however, may be rather elusive. With 
hindsight, the perspective of complexity could have warned the EC and the national exchanges against 
setting up Nasdaq-like high-tech segments. 
The recent trend of AIM imitators (see Alternext) and of AIM-initiated markets (as with AIM 
Italy and Tokyo AIM) can be best understood by means of Winter and Szulanski's (2001) concept of 
replication strategy, and Rivkin's (2001) analysis of the comparative difficulties faced by imitators and 
replicators at various levels of complexity. Although AIM possesses an informational advantage with 
respect to its imitators, in the form of a better assessment of the original "template", Rivkin's (2001) 
analysis indicates that with high complexity, replication of market architecture by AIM can be nearly as 
difficult as its imitation by competitors. It is only at moderate complexity levels that the replicator 
reaps the benefits of its superior information on the template. 
A concrete illustration of the difficulties to replicate a financial market has been provided in the 
case of the French New Market by Revest (2010). The French Market Authorities did not give enough 
weight to the Paris Stock Exchange history and to the skills and experience of the intermediaries. For 
instance, market making was a completely new function in Paris and intermediaries were not able to 
perform it in an effective way. 
4. The AIM: Success and threats
Since its inception, the AIM market capitalization has evolved from 82.2 million pounds in 1995 to 
81,276.8 million pounds in April 2011, and money raised by companies has increased from 96.5 to 
2,088.2  million  pounds  during  the  same  period  (Table  2).  The  number  of  listed  companies  has 
increased from 10 in 1995 to 1,165 in April 2011. The AIM underwent trouble after the burst of the 
Internet bubble, as well as during the current financial crisis, yet it proved more resilient than most 
other markets for growing companies. Examining the listing, one finds that while most companies are 
based  in  the  UK,  some  of  them  have  significant  assets  outside  the  UK  and  can  be  viewed  as 
international companies (Bauer and Boritz, 2006). In addition, a growing number of foreign firms – and 
notably, US firms - have entered the market in the last decade. The number of international companies 
quintupled between the end of 2003 (60) and August 2006 (304). Between 2004 and 2008, the number 
of new listings was higher on the AIM than on the LSE main market and on the Nasdaq (Gerakos et al.  
2011, see Table 3). Quite interestingly, AIM was also able to attract companies from the Main Market,  
which outnumbered the companies graduating from AIM to the Main Market (see also Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai 2008, Gerakos et al. 2011). We have already mentioned in Sections 2 and 3 that AIM has 
replicated its market architecture in Italy and Japan, and its competitive pressure has spawned imitation 
efforts by NYSE-Euronext (Alternext) and by Nasdaq-OMX (First North). 
All these figures and facts testify to the success of AIM if seen in terms of capitalization growth 
and increasing market participation (i.e. dimensional growth). One goal of this section is to review the 
main theoretical  reasons behind such “popularity”.  Yet,  the  process  of  dimensional  growth of  the 
market can threaten the achievement of a satisfactory “quality” of the listed companies and the market's 
ability to support TBSFs. We explore this issue by reviewing the results of empirical studies about the 
performance of AIM companies.
4.1. Why is the AIM so popular?
How comes a market catering to relatively untested small caps managed to survive across nearly two 
decades constellated with financial bubbles, to experience dimensional growth, and even to attract an 
increasing  flow of  international  companies?  To  date,  this  question  has  not  yet  been  subjected  to 
empirical scrutiny, but a number of theoretical explanations can be formulated, including regulatory 
arbitrage, sector diversification of the listing, and location advantages. Such explanations should by no 
means be viewed as strict substitutes, since the underlying mechanisms may be at work at the same 
time, and may even reinforce one another.  
4.1.1. Regulatory arbitrage
The concept of regulatory arbitrage refers to the fact that companies can exploit differences among 
regulatory  regimes  in  order  to  increase  their  profits.  The  migration  of  IPO  activity  from  tightly 
regulated to lightly regulated markets, and the AIM’s ability to attract companies previously listed on 
the LSE Main Market and US companies, look like outcomes of regulatory arbitrage. In this view, 
regulatory arbitrage was triggered by factors that increased the comparative advantage of AIM as a 
provider of liquidity and trading services. AIM’s low fees, fast admission procedure, and customized 
oversight may have increased its attractiveness, whereas the attractiveness of other stock markets may 
have been diminished by regulatory changes, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.
To begin with, AIM offers low admission costs and listing fees to public equity for small firms. 
The total cost of an AIM initial listing appears to be lower than a Nasdaq initial listing. The cost is  
equal to 3,426,300 US$ for the AIM against 4,472, 000 for the Nasdaq, based on the premise of a 
company seeking to launch a $50 million IPO on both AIM and Nasdaq (Mendoza, 2008, p. 307). The 
direct ongoing listing costs are also limited for the AIM ($ 147,300) compared to the NASDAQ ($ 
3,515,500), in the case of a completed $50 million IPO. In addition to the low admission and listing 
fees, the AIM guarantees a rapid introduction procedure. The standard procedure takes between three to 
six months to complete (Rousseau, 2007). It involves the production of an admission document (a 
prospectus) that is not appraised by the LSE authorities. Since 2003, companies can also use the fast-
track route, available for issuers that are already listed on recognized foreign exchanges. In that case,  
the company does not have to produce an admission document.  Further savings are related to the 
customized regulatory oversight guaranteed by the Nomads (see Section 3.2 for more details). 
The cost advantages implied by the peculiar AIM model are reinforced by regulatory reforms 
affecting the competitiveness of other markets. The purported role of SOX in the erosion of the US 
financial markets competitiveness and the migration of IPO activity towards non-US financial markets 
is  a  hotly  debated  topic.  Opponents  of  SOX  blame  it  for  increasing  the  costs  of  listing  on  US 
exchanges, and are favorable to a lighter approach to securities regulation (Blumberg-Schumer Report, 
2007; Mendoza, 2008). In their view, US companies after SOX feel the presence of a regulatory burden 
and prefer to go public on lightly regulated markets, such as the AIM (Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008;  
Coates, 2007; Leuz, 2007; see also the Report of the Committee on Capital Market Regulation, or 
Paulson Report, 2006). Since the higher regulatory costs are imposed without regard to firm size, SOX 
seems to particularly stimulate the migration of smaller  firms (Mendoza,  2008).  Consequently,  the 
post-SOX improved attractiveness of AIM is rooted in novel US regulation that does not discriminate 
between  small  and  large  firms  (Mendoza,  2008;  Jenkinson  and  Ramadorai,  2008;  Hoque,  2011; 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2008). 
In an alternative perspective, the US companies attracted by AIM may be unable to comply with 
strict information requirements, and their move to a lighter regulatory setting would signal their lower 
chances of survival. Indeed, supporters of SOX claim that its higher costs are more than offset by the 
long-term benefits related to positive selection effects. In particular, SOX may exert a dissuasive effect 
on fraudulent behaviors. Moreover, and consistent with the regulatory bonding hypothesis, companies 
that do submit to high regulatory standards signal higher quality to their investors (Coffee, 1999, 2002; 
Stulz,  1999;  Reese  and Weisbach,  2002;  Doidge,  Karolyi  and Stulz,  2004,  Zingales,  2007).  Also, 
controlling shareholders find it more difficult to extract value from minority investors under the SOX 
legislation (Duarte et al., 2011). 
4.1.2. Sector diversification of the listing
The diversification of the listing across sectors has presumably allowed AIM to avoid the collapse 
undergone by the European New Markets in 2000-2002. The composition of the AIM listing may have 
diluted an otherwise overly risky listing based on TBSFs, thereby attracting companies, intermediaries, 
and investments. Even during the Internet bubble, the AIM listing was more diversified than the other 
European NM, which housed mainly companies from a narrow set of R&D-intensive sectors. By the 
end of 1999, more than 80% of the Easdaq companies belonged to technology-based sectors, such as 
software,  electronics,  IT,  biotech  and  medical  equipment,  telecommunications,  and  specialized 
equipment (Charlesworth, 2000). On the Nuovo Mercato, telecommunications accounted for the largest 
emission share (over 40%); biotech and IT had relevant weights too (Petrella, 2001). Conversely, high 
technology firms on the AIM have never accounted for more than 25% of market turnover (AIM 
Statistics; see also Mallin and Ow-Yong 2009), and over time it has broadened its scope including 
companies from traditional sectors, such as mining, oil, gas and real estate (Mendoza, 2008). AIM has 
extended its scope including firms engaged in a wide variety of activities.  Among them, the three most  
represented sectors are Financials (24%), Industrials (19%), and Consumer Services (15%) (Mallin and 
Ow-Yong, 2009). 
4.1.3. Location advantages
Location-specific advantages provide yet another set of explanatory factors. In particular, AIM seems 
to enjoy positive reputation spillovers from the London financial centre and from the relatively large 
size of the UK venture capital  industry.  London attracts  a  large pool  of  sophisticated institutional 
investors, who build close links with both the companies and the Nomads. In addition, it hosts a large 
number of specialists, such as investment banks, underwriters, and brokers, endowed with cumulated 
experience and competencies. Previous studies on cross-listing have shown the importance of analyst 
coverage  and  experienced  specialists,  as  well  as  “be  with  your  peers”  effects  for  young  high-
technology companies (Blass and Yafeh, 2001, Pagano et al., 2002). The attractiveness of AIM is also 
related to the UK venture capital being the main venture capital industry in Europe, representing about 
21% of the European venture capital industry in 2009 (EVCA statistics; Revest and Sapio, 2010). On 
top of this, it must also be noted that UK venture capitalists over time slightly improved their attitude 
towards young and small firms, while in the early Nineties they tended to give priority to large deal 
sizes and large companies (Murray 1999, Jeng and Wells 2000, Lockett et al. 2002, Mayer, Schoors  
and Yafeh 2005). A robust venture capital industry such as the one in the UK may have supported the 
growth of AIM: AIM offers exit opportunities to venture capital investments, and in return venture 
capitalists supply AIM with high potential companies that benefited from their advices. 
4.2. The existing empirical evidence: Contrasting views on the performance of AIM
The increasing number of domestic and international firms listed, the continued capitalization growth, 
the replication and imitation of the AIM model around the world - all testify to the popularity of AIM. 
At the same time, one may envision a trade-off between dimensional growth of the market and the 
average “quality” of the listed firms. Indeed, there are reasons to expect that the marginal entrant will 
be significantly worse than the extant firms in terms of long-term returns, survival rates, solvency, 
growth rates, R&D productivity. Conflicts of interest between the Nomads and the companies they 
supervise, rooted in AIM’s discretionary screening and oversight approach, may attract companies that 
struggled to survive on the official listing, as well as cash shells. Therefore, a question naturally arises: 
Is  dimensional growth of the market achieved at the expense of listing quality? And what are the 
consequences for the market’s ability to support TBSFs? Recent and on-going empirical studies shed 
light on two main issues: the characteristics and performances of the firms listed on AIM, and the 
influence  of  the  level  of  regulation  on  IPO migrations  between  AIM and  the  LSE Main  Market 
(Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2008, Campbell and Tabner, 2010, Hoque 2011).  
4.2.1. Characteristics and performances of the listed companies
A number of empirical works have examined the performance of the companies listed on AIM, with 
respect  to  dimensions  such as  operating  performances,  stock  returns,  survival  rates,  and corporate 
governance structures. The insight behind those works is that facilitating the access to public equity can 
stimulate unsuitable companies to go public -  and as those companies underperform and leave the 
market, small investors suffer losses, and the public resources spent to support TBSFs get wasted.
Operating  performances  and  stock  returns. Hoque  (2011)  examines  the  operating 
performances  of  firms  listed  on  the  AIM and on  the  Main  List.  Over  the  period  1995-2010,  the 
operating performance in the 5 years after IPO, on average, is negative for AIM for all years, and 
positive  for  the  main  market.  Stock  returns  are  lower  on  the  AIM  than  on  the  Main  List.  AIM 
companies are less likely to make acquisitions, produce lower dividends, and are more likely to be 
cancelled. Yet, the probability of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) is higher on the AIM than on the 
Main List.  Relatively bad operating performances by AIM firms are underlined by Gerakos et  al.  
(2011), too, who perform a comparison between the AIM, the LSE Main List, the Nasdaq and the 
OTCBB. AIM post-IPO share prices are found to under-perform IPOs on other markets. AIM firms 
tend to under-perform even when they are accompanied by Nomads who are also brokers and auditors, 
and more generally, the choice of Nomads does not have an influence on performance. Another test 
performed by the authors concerns the ability of the AIM to support the most promising firms. AIM’s 
fast growing firms do not receive extra-returns: they are less likely to have extra positive outcomes than 
firms listing on other exchanges. Finally, the performance of AIM companies appears to be rather close 
to that of Pink Sheet companies as regards liquidity and informational asymmetry. 
Survival rates. “I’m concerned that 30 per cent of issuers that list on AIM are gone in a year.  
That feels like a casino to me”. This statement by Roel Campos, an SEC commissioner (Bawden and 
Waller 2007), has triggered two empirical studies, asking whether the estimated survival rates of AIM 
companies are as low as suspected. Espenlaub et al. (2008) have found that AIM IPOs exhibit high 
survival rates over the short-term (1 to 2 years after IPO), controlling for size, age, initial returns, 
country of incorporation, VC-backing, sector and time dummies. Over the long run (five years post 
IPO),  the probability  of surviving is  positively related to age at  IPO, size,  and UK incorporation. 
Lastly, IPOs in information technology tend to have higher probability of failure (over 5 years) than 
IPOs in other sectors. Consequently, the results by Espenlaub et al. show that AIM cannot be seen as a 
casino. Such optimistic results are contradicted by Gerakos et al. (2011), who show that AIM firms 
have higher instantaneous failures rates than firms listings on the Nasdaq, LSE Main Market, or the 
OTCBB: 24,8% of the AIM sample firms fail within a year of listing, quite strikingly in line with 
Campos' prediction. It must be said, however, that Gerakos et al. (2011) only control for market value 
at listing, sector fixed effects, and year fixed effects, therefore raising robustness issues.
Corporate governance. The topic of company quality is approached by Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(2009) through the analysis of the determinants of corporate governance voluntary disclosure on the 
AIM. Based on the examination of 300 financial reports, voluntary corporate governance disclosure is 
positively associated with company size, board size, positive turnover, and is higher for companies 
coming from the main market. At the same time, young companies with little or no trading history 
display a high commitment to corporate governance practices. Two main results can be emphasized: 
firstly,  corporate  governance  practices  largely  depend  on  the  internal  characteristics  of  the  AIM 
companies. Secondly, among the companies that are involved in good corporate governance practices, 
two different groups emerge. One group includes recently-established and young firms listed on the 
AIM which want to produce a positive signal toward investors. The other group contains mature firms 
that are used to corporate governance practices or that have the required internal competencies.
4.2.2. Who are the switchers?
A comparison of the firms’ listing changes between the AIM and the Main List of the LSE and their 
determinants  has  been  performed  by  Jenkinson  and  Ramadorai  (2008)  and  Campbell  and  Tabner 
(2010). Assessing the characteristics of the switching companies can be useful in order to understand 
whether  attracting  main  market  companies  is  beneficial  or  harmful  for  the  average quality  of  the 
companies quoted on AIM. The quality of the companies switching from the Main Market to AIM can 
be inferred by exploring the reasons behind the switches or, alternatively, by estimating the effect of a 
listing change on the switchers’ stock returns. 
Concerning the determinants of the switches, the reasons quoted by the managers to explain why 
they switch from the Main market to the AIM appear to be consistent with the specificity of the AIM’s 
model:  lighter  regulation,  low  listing  costs,  and  a  market  design  more  favorable  to  small  firms 
(Campbell and Tabner, 2010). Among other reasons, it is worth mentioning the willingness to attract 
new shareholders. A particular firm profile emerges: companies that switch from the LSE main list to 
AIM are rather small and credit constrained, do not generate enough cash flow, and suffer from a too 
rigid and costly regulation.  In other words,  their  expected reward from staying in the main list  is  
negative. A shift to the AIM allows them to raise equity through Seasoned Equity Offerings, which are  
more numerous on the AIM, partly because firms on the AIM do not need shareholders approval for 
these transactions (Hoque 2011).
When  the  movements  come  from  the  AIM  toward  the  main  market,  the  predominant 
explanatory factors can be split in two interdependent categories (Campbell and Tabner, 2010). First, 
companies  may  desire  to  increase  their  shareholders  base.  The  empirical  evidence  shows  that 
ownership concentration is declining when there is a switch from the AIM to the Main Market. In 
addition,  being  listed  on  the  main  market  may  be  synonymous  of  a  more  desirable  profile  and 
reputation  in  order  both  to  attract  new  investors  and  talented  personnel.  Second,  the  market  for 
corporate control seems more dynamic in the main market than in the AIM (Hoque 2011, Campbell  
and Tabner 2010). Consequently, companies may believe that they will have more opportunities to 
realize  mergers  and acquisitions  in  the main  market.  Campbell  and Tabner  (2010)  shape also the 
agency-based hypothesis that managers can choose to go to the main market at the end of a period of 
good performance in order to maximize their personal wealth. 
Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2008) and Campbell and Tabner (2010) have examined whether the 
decision to change listing status between the LSE Official Listing and the AIM affects stock returns. 
Even if the two studies exhibit a few technical differences (Table 4), they converge to the same results:  
firms that shift from the Main List to the AIM exhibit negative abnormal returns at the announcement 
and positive abnormal returns after the implementation. The reverse movement is observed when firms 
move  from the  AIM to  the  main  list:  they  are  characterized  by  positive  abnormal  returns  at  the 
announcement and negative abnormal returns afterwards. A switch from AIM to the Main List signals 
that the company is ready to face higher standards of disclosure and corporate governance, justifying a 
lower  cost  of  capital  -  in  line  with  the  bonding hypothesis.  The increase  in  the  bonding costs  is  
outweighed by a lower cost of capital, and the switchers’ stock prices rise. After the implementation, 
expected returns fall because the risk premium for investors is lower, taking agency risk into account  
(Campbell and Tabner, 2010). In the case of a switch from the main List to the AIM, investors estimate 
that the agency risk will be higher in the AIM than in the Official List (because of a decrease in the  
bonding  costs  and  a  higher  cost  of  capital),  so  the  switchers’  stock  prices  fall.  Then,  after 
implementation,  the  abnormal  positive  returns  can  be  interpreted  as  a  reward  to  shareholders  for 
bearing increased levels of agency risks. Overall, agency risk plays a crucial role in explaining the 
differential returns of firms in two regulation regimes, in the spirit of Skaife et al. (2004). Jenkinson 
and Ramadorai (2008) insist particularly on the role of institutional investors. They observe a small 
increase in aggregate institutional holdings in the six months following a switch to the AIM, from 23% 
to  nearly  25%.  This  suggests  that  institutional  investors  are  not  abandoning companies  once  they 
switch to the segment with lighter regulation. The conclusion is that there exist  particular investor 
clienteles for the two markets.
Overall, switches from AIM to the Main Market may deprive AIM of dynamic companies, while 
companies that switch from the Main Market to AIM are rather low-quality. 
 4.2.3. Voluntarily delisted companies and cash shells
As we have previously mentioned, the dimensional growth of a stock market can come at the expense 
of the quality of the listing. The positive trend in market admissions can threaten the AIM functioning 
inasmuch as an increasing number of foreign entrants is made up of offshore vehicles and cash shells. 
If investors perceive the market as increasingly risky, many promising TBSFs may find it convenient to 
delist. 
Cash shell through reverse takeover operations and under the guise of investment companies have 
abused the market, as shown by the scandals involving Regal Petroleum and Chariot. In an attempt to 
fix  this  problem,  in  2006 AIM introduced a  new rulebook for  Nomads  in  order  to  increase  their 
eligibility criteria, to fix their responsibilities, and to make them more accountable for the companies 
they introduce (Mendoza, 2008). A new rule was also implemented, according to which cash shells that 
raise less than 3 million pounds on listing and do not complete a deal within a given time receive a six 
month trading suspension since April,  2006.  Because of  this,  38 companies  were  suspended from 
trading in 2006 (Bauer and Boritz, 2006). In 2007 a new scandal altered the AIM functioning. The 
Langbar International Fraud which represents the biggest fraud discovered until now. Enquiries showed 
that this company had none of the assets it declared (375 million £). 
Pour  and Lasfer  (2011)  estimate  the  impact  of  firm’s  capital  structure  on  the  probability  to 
voluntarily delist, using a sample of AIM listed companies. The findings suggest that the firms that  
choose to delist had, at the time of IPO, a higher leverage, a higher share of intangible assets, less 
growth opportunities and lower capital expenditure than those choosing to stay listed. Such evidence is 
in line with the theoretical expectations about companies that go dark and companies that go private, 
included among voluntary delisting in the paper. Companies that choose to go private feel a necessity 
to change: they may be inefficiently managed, under-leveraged or undervalued by the market (see for  
instance Lehn and Poulsen, 1989, Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990, for studies on other financial markets). 
On the other hand, going dark appears as an answer to financial difficulties and distress. Companies 
that choose to go dark are usually small companies characterized by poor performance and low growth,  
whose  difficulties  are  worsened by stock market  regulation.  According to  Leuz et  al.  (2008),  the 
decision to go dark may also be motivated by agency problems and insiders interests. For instance, 
managers can avoid dismissal due to poor performance by going dark. Also, managers can choose to go 
dark in order to extract private benefit or protect themselves against regulatory actions.
5. Conclusion
Our main objectives in this paper were to explore the historical evolution of European stock markets  
for growing companies, to illustrate their organizational forms, and to evaluate their performances. We 
focused on the AIM because of its long-lasting dimensional growth that led it to be recognized as a 
possible organizational model of a financial market able to bridge the equity gap of TBSFs. 
What have we learnt from the history of the European financial markets dedicated to TBSFs? A 
first result refers to the variety of the market architectures which succeeded one another. There is no 
unique model for the stock market for growing companies, but several ones, according to different 
criteria  such  as  listing  requirements,  information  disclosure  and  regulatory  responsibilities.  Each 
organizational architecture displays both advantages and drawbacks for TBSFs. Secondly, the different 
forms of market organization result from adaptive responses of public and private actors to the threats 
and  opportunities  posed  by  the  changing  macroeconomic  and  technological  environments.  Public 
bodies  at  the  national  and  supranational  level  (especially  the  EC)  as  well  as  the  national  stock 
exchanges have played a crucial role in shaping market architecture. Yet, the variety of the actors 
involved may induce conflicting views and the market design may result from severe negotiations, or 
appear as a compromise. Thirdly, the emergence and development of financial markets dedicated to 
TBSFs have to be examined through the regulatory changes that could stimulate or at the opposite 
slacken a market’s expansion. Regulatory changes produce unintended consequences which can be 
judged as positive or negative for a particular market, such as the beneficial effects of SOX on the 
AIM.  Fourthly,  the  history  of  financial  markets  dedicated  to  TBSFs  sheds  light  on  the  issue  of 
replicating a market. In the case of the “New markets” created during the 1990s in continental Europe, 
“copying”  Nasdaq  turned  out  to  be  a  failing  strategy.  The  complexity  of  market  architectures, 
compounding many highly interdependent elements, combined together through the heavy use of tacit 
knowledge, makes the replication of a market a very difficult task (Rivkin, 2001). More broadly, if we 
consider markets as institutions, imitation of market organizational forms is also viewed as a delicate 
issue because of the presence of informal rules and the continued interactions between formal and 
informal rules.
In this context, how can we explain the expansion of the AIM?  The AIM does not arise from the 
European wave of Nasdaq copies. We have suggested that the AIM‘s popularity relies on regulatory 
arbitrage induced by some regulatory changes (e.g. SOX) that made the AIM relatively more attractive 
- at least for those companies that view tight regulation not as a signal of financial soundness, but rather 
as a heavy burden. AIM's ability to expand also relies on diversification of its listing across sectors, that 
dilutes  the  risk  attached to  companies  in  high-tech industries,  and has  allowed the  AIM to better  
withstand the consequences of the Internet Bubble crash. Finally, the AIM benefits also from location 
advantages, i.e. from positive externalities coming from the London financial center.
Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of the empirical performances of the AIM – and especially relating 
to the characteristics of the firms listed, reveals contrasted views and shadow zones. On the one hand, 
for some scholars the AIM is not as risky as a casino, and AIM IPOs exhibit quite a high survival rate 
over the short term (Espenlaub et al., 2008). Several arguments are advanced to explain the AIM’s 
attractiveness both from the viewpoints of firms and investors. Firstly, there exists a specific class of 
investors for this market, who are rewarding for bearing increasing levels of agency risk - compared to 
the main market (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2008; Campbell and Tabner, 2010).  Secondly, different 
reasons may push firms to be listed on the AIM: because firms are too small and credit constrained, 
they do not expect rewards from being listed on the main market. The AIM offers to this particular 
profile of firms a less rigid and costly regulation, and the opportunity to raise equity through Seasoned 
Equity Offerings (Campbell and Tabner, 2010; Hoque, 2011). Hence, the existence of the AIM and its 
popularity is justified by the argument “one size does not fit to all” (Mendoza, 2008). On the other 
hand, the empirical evidence raises the issue of the firms’ quality. Operative performance and stock 
returns on the AIM are shown to be negative over the medium term (Hoque, 2011, Gerakos et al.,  
2011). The performances of AIM’s companies are worse than those on the LSE main market and on the 
Nasdaq (Gerakos et al., 2011). 
The low quality of the firms appears as a major threat for the future of the AIM, and especially 
through cash shells and reverse takeovers. Scandals and anomalies already happened, but regulatory 
concerns increase with its growth. Will a market characterized by a principle based regulatory approach 
be  able  to  control  and  sanction  fraudulent  behaviors,  if  the  number  of  listed  firms  continues  to 
increase? In other words, the characteristics of the AIM’s market model which were at the origin of its 
success  -  few  rules,  close  relationships  between  few  actors,  Nomads  and  institutional  investors, 
reputation effects - can be transformed in harmful features for the long term stability of the market.  
This debate is all the more necessary as the AIM model spreads in the world. The role of the policy 
makers is to take the measure of the threat in order both to avoid a new financial crisis as the Internet  
bubble crisis and in order to allow these markets to finance the promising and high quality companies. 
In our view, future studies on the AIM should focus on two topics: the profile of the investors and 
the operations conducted by the firms listed on the AIM. Although the AIM was tailored to a certain 
extent for retail investors, institutional investors are in majority (Mendoza, 2008, Gerakos et al., 2011).  
The related question is: who are really these investors? What are their profiles? Why do they invest in 
companies that generally underperform with respect to firms in other markets? At the same time, in 
order  to  better  understand why firms choose the  AIM, one could explore the issues  of  takeovers,  
acquisitions and mergers. One hypothesis is that this market can be seen more as a market for corporate 
control than a market that allows firms to raise capital.
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Petrella G. (2001), “Sistemi finanziari e finanziamento delle imprese innovative: profili teorici
ed evidenze empiriche dall’Europa”, Quaderni ref n.4.
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